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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, Second Amendment objections to firearm regulation 
did not present itself.1  Even upon objection, longstanding prohibitions on 
who may possess firearms, what type of firearms, and how and where 
possession occurs have been consistently upheld.2  Recently, a few circuit 
courts have introduced a ‘why’ question to the regulation of firearms.3  
These courts have placed more weight on the negative externalities of 
bearing arms than on a law-abiding citizen’s right to self-defense in public. 
Several circuit courts have held that the government can refuse to 
permit a law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public until the citizen has 
established a reason ‘why’ he or she needs a concealed firearm for self-
defense.4  In contrast, other sister circuit courts have held that the 
restrictions on bearing arms in public have gone too far when the burden 
is placed on law-abiding citizens to demonstrate why they need a firearm 
to ward off a specific dangerous person.5  Requiring this ‘why’ veers far 
from the longstanding prohibitions on possession in sensitive places and 
possession by those who have proven themselves dangerous to society.6  
Law-abiding citizens have proven their right to bear arms by their conduct 
and these ‘why’ restrictions conflict with their right to be “armed and 
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another 
person.”7  Nevertheless, several circuit courts have ignored the 
government’s burden to prove whether it has the authority to infringe upon 
an individual’s constitutional right to bear arms8 and has placed the burden 
                                                                                                             
 1 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008). 
 2 Id. at 626–27. 
 3 See e.g. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 4 Id.; see also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. 
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 5 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 6 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings). 
 7 Id.  at 584 (internal quotations omitted). 
 8 See e.g. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87–88; Drake, 724 F.3d at 443. (Both courts 
assumed the general public had no right to self-defense without a “justifiable need” or 
“proper cause” to carry a handgun. Neither court placed a burden on the government to 
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on the shoulders of law-abiding citizens to prove they have the right to 
defend themselves.9 
These circuit courts ignore the implication of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis that the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than 
the right to simply have a gun in one’s home.10  In addition, these courts 
ignore that the Supreme Court has declared armed self-defense as the 
central component to Second Amendment rights.11  In spite of this, these 
courts have banned a large swath of law-abiding citizens from bearing 
arms in public, while not considering whether they could bear arms openly 
in their respective states.12  Although it was established in 1897 that a 
prohibition on carrying concealed weapons does not infringe upon Second 
Amendment rights, carrying arms was never considered a right that could 
be prohibited for the law-abiding.13 
Nonetheless, the judiciary in general has justified restricting access 
to firearms in order to “promote public safety and eliminate negative 
externalities.”14  The objective of the judiciary is to perform a balancing 
of individual liberties and negative externalities.15  However, when it 
comes to the bearing of arms by the law-abiding, the Second Amendment 
“is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” that the court 
should not “conduct anew.”16  Therefore, outside of the “longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, 
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places,”17 law-
abiding citizens do not need a ‘why’ to bear arms because the Constitution 
gives them the right to “judicial toleration of the negative externalities”18 
of bearing arms in public. 
Below, this proposition and the thought process involved are further 
discussed.  Part I describes the responsive dance the Supreme Court and 
Congress have performed since the 18th century, cautiously shuffling 
through the issue of bearing arms.  Part II further describes how the circuit 
courts, as of early 2018, have stepped into that dance and asserted their 
own paths toward new restrictions on bearing arms.  Part III challenges 
                                                                                                             
prove the general public had no such constitutional right although the cases both were ruled 
upon after Heller and McDonald). 
 9 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88; Drake, 724 F.3d at 431. 
 10 See Moore, 702 F.3d at 935. 
 11 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 12 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942. 
 13 U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875). 
 14 Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
951, 953 n.3 (2011). 
 15 Id. at 963. 
 16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 17 Id. at 626–27. 
 18 Blackman supra note 14, at 956. 
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those restrictions through an analysis of burden shifting and interest 
balancing.  Part IV considers this author’s proposition for the Supreme 
Court’s next choreographed move toward judicial toleration.  Finally, Part 
V concludes with practical implications with or without this movement in 
the law. 
II. BACKGROUND OF BEARING ARMS 
A. 18th & 19th Centuries 
On December 15, 1791, Virginia was the last necessary state to ratify 
ten of the first twelve proposed amendments, consequently adding the Bill 
of Rights to the Constitution.19  The States did not ratify the first two 
proposals that aimed at protecting the principles of representation via 
reapportionment and controlling the compensation of representatives.20  
This inaction framed the Bill of Rights to be solely focused on individual 
rights for the first nine amendments and states’ rights for the tenth.21  
Therefore, the “collective rights” argument for the Second Amendment 
will not be addressed in this article.22  What will be addressed in Part I is 
that Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently held, from 1791 
to 2018, that the right to bear arms can only be marginally regulated and 
not outright prohibited for law-abiding citizens. 
Congress ratified the following text of the second amendment in 
1791 and the text has never been altered.  “A well-regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”23  It was not until 1856 when the 
Supreme Court embraced this right in the infamous case, Dredd Scott v. 
Sanford.24  There, the court declared the “privileges and immunities of 
citizens . . . give them the full liberty . . . to keep and carry arms wherever 
they went.”25  Soon after the Civil War, Congress spoke out on the right to 
bear arms for the first time since 1789 with the Freedman’s Bureau Act of 
                                                                                                             
 19 Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 532 (1992). 
 20 Id. at 530–31. 
 21 Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 220 (1983). 
 22 See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 
222 (1990) (This article does not thoroughly address this issue, but this court declared that 
‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment are individuals, not states, which 
reinforced the ‘individual rights’ argument on Second Amendment issues.). 
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 24 See 60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1856) (superseded on other grounds (1868)). 
 25 Id. at 416–17. 
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1866.26  The law mirrored the Supreme Court’s findings from ten years 
before: “the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security . . . including 
the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to, and enjoyed by 
all citizens.”27  Although Congress reached the same conclusion as the 
Supreme Court, the reasoning for the law could not have been farther 
apart.  In 1856, the Supreme Court embraced the right to bear arms to keep 
non-citizens from obtaining it.28  In 1866, Congress embraced the right to 
bear arms because “the threat of this period was not a federal standing 
army, but state encroachment on basic civil rights, and the issue focused 
on private violence and local lapses in protection rather than federal 
tyranny.”29  Law-abiding citizens needed their right to bear arms 
unobstructed through governmental regulations and Congress delivered 
protection of their right. 
Within a decade, the Supreme Court further embraced the right to 
bear arms by holding it above the Constitution itself.30  In Cruikshank it 
declared, “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution.  Neither is it in 
any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.”31  As a side 
note, the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872 boldly placed state civil rights 
enforcement out of the hands of the federal government, silently removing 
Fourteenth Amendment federal protections for the right to bear arms.32  
This dicta pronouncement was overturned by McDonald in 2010.33  In 
1886, the Court narrowed the right to exclude military drill-and-parade-
under-arms outside of the control of the government.34  There, the Presser 
Court emphasized the difference between the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble and a mere assembly of people as a military company 
that drills and parades with arms, which is not a right.35  With this 
narrowing came a broad stroke of the Supreme Court’s power to deny any 
other restriction on the individual’s right to bear arms.36  “[T]he states 
                                                                                                             
 26 Sean J. Kealy, The Second Amendment as Interpreted by Congress and the Court, 3 
NE. U.L.J. 225, 250 (2011). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Scott, 60 U.S. at 416–17. 
 29 Kealy, supra note 26, at 251. 
 30 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77–79, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872). 
 33 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 
2d 894 (2010) (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”)   
 34 See Presser v. People of State of Ill., 116 U.S. 252, 267, 6 S. Ct. 580, 29 L. Ed. 615 
(1886). 
 35 Id. at 266–67. 
 36 Id. at 265. 
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cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, 
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the 
United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, 
and disable the people from performing their duty to the general 
government.”37  With the stroke of a pen, the Court informed law-abiding 
citizens that the right to parade with arms could only be granted by the 
government and its ruling was prohibiting no other use of arms.38  This 
was the beginning of ‘how’ one could bear arms. 
In 1897, the Supreme Court plunged deep into our country’s English 
ancestry and expressed concern that the Bill of Rights could be interpreted 
as being a novel expression of new rights without exception.39  Seemingly 
off topic, the Robertson Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment was 
never intended to apply to the deserting seamen’s contracts within the 
conflict.40  In dicta, the Court announced that the Second Amendment also 
consisted of certain well-recognized exceptions as the Thirteenth.41  This 
unenumerated Second Amendment exception created by the Court was 
said to have been passed down from our English ancestors, who prohibited 
the carrying of concealed weapons.42  It read, “the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms (under article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting 
the carrying of concealed weapons.”43  There, the Robertson Court halted 
the notion that the Bill of Rights was a blank check with which individual 
citizens could cash with full protection of his or her right.44  Other than the 
reference to English law, no further explanation for this exception can be 
found in Robertson.45  This lack of American precedent and weakness 
inherent in dicta pronouncements should make way for a 21st century 
Supreme Court to produce a different outcome.  Since 1897, the ‘how’ of 
bearing arms lost its Second Amendment protections unless born openly,46 
but that can change. 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. 
 38 Id at 264–65. 
 39 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. at 281. 
 40 Id. at 287–88. 
 41 Id. at 281–82. (As the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit all contracts that 
could be deemed to include involuntary servitude, neither does the Second Amendment 
prohibit all gun regulation such as laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons). 
 42 Id. at 281. 
 43 Id. at 281–82. 
 44 Id. at 281. (“The law is perfectly well settled that the first 10 amendments to the 
Constitution, commonly known as the ‘Bill of Rights,’ were not intended to lay down any 
novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities 
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, 
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the 
case.”). 
 45 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 275. 
 46 Id. at 281. 
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B. 20th & 21st Centuries 
As the roaring twenties were well under way, Congress supported the 
Court’s restrictions on concealed weapons with the enactment of the 
Mailing Firearms Act (“MFA”) of 1927.47  The MFA “prohibited the 
mailing of concealable firearms through the United States Postal 
Service.”48  In the 1930s the question evolved from ‘how’ weapons could 
be born to ‘what’ weapons could be born.49  Congress introduced the 
National Firearms Act (“NFA”) in 1934, which “taxed the manufacture, 
sale, and transfer of short-barreled rifles and shotguns, machine guns, and 
silencers.”50  Then in 1938, the Federal Firearms Act (“FFA”) “spread a 
thin coat of regulation over all firearms and many classes of ammunition 
suitable for handguns.”51 The FFA went even further to hint at ‘who’ could 
possibly be restricted from bearing arms.52  “Licensees were prohibited 
from knowingly shipping a firearm in interstate commerce to some felons, 
a fugitive from justice, a person under indictment, or anyone required to 
have a license under the law of the seller’s state who did not have a 
license.”53  The Supreme Court ended the decade refocusing the law on 
‘what’ arms could be born.54  There, the Miller Court held, 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 
‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time 
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the 
right to keep and bear such an instrument.55 
For the next generation, the Supreme Court and Congress would only 
be heard once, respectively, on this topic.  Congress began this short 
conversation in 1941 with the Property Requisition Act (“PRA”).56  
Although the PRA dealt with the federal government requisitioning 
private property, Congress used it to clarify that an individual right to bear 
arms would not be infringed due to this Act’s enforcement.57  The PRA 
                                                                                                             
 47 Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1587 
(2014). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816, 83 L. Ed. 1206 (1939). 
 50 Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 
48, 60 (2008). 
 51 Franklin Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 133, 140 (1975). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Miller, 307 U.S. 174. 
 55 Id. at 178. 
 56 Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by 
A Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597 
(1995). 
 57 Id. at 599. 
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read, “Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed—(1) to authorize 
the requisitioning or require the registration of any firearms possessed by 
any individual . . . [or](2) to impair or infringe in any manner the right of 
any individual to keep and bear arms.”58  The Supreme Court only 
glimpsed at this topic when it dealt with cases challenging the FFA in 
1943.59  There, the Tot Court held that a provision of the FFA which would 
prohibit the possession of firearms by those convicted of crimes of 
violence was unreasonable if the prohibition was due to the firearms 
traveling through interstate commerce.60  Tot rejected the presumption 
that, “mere possession tends strongly to indicate that acquisition must have 
been in an interstate transaction.”61  With Tot, Congress was informed that 
it had stretched its Commerce Clause powers too far.62  With that, the 
responsive dance between the Supreme Court and Congress ended and did 
not resume for the next twenty-five years.63 
The counter-culture movement of the 1960s reignited the Supreme 
Court and Congress’ interest in protecting individual rights.64   The Court 
acted first in 1966.65  There, the Katzenbach Court declared that Congress’ 
power granted by the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment; [section five] grants Congress no power to 
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”66  Although the Court’s 
move was not specifically targeted at the right to bear arms, when 
Congress considered passing gun control laws just two years later,67 it 
became the main issue.  The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) reads, 
It is not the purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal 
Restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the 
acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of 
hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other 
lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate 
the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens.68 
Additionally, the GCA restricted the right for “minors, convicted 
felons, and persons who had been adjudicated as mental defectives or 
                                                                                                             
 58 Id. 
 59 See Tot v. U.S., 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed. 1519 (1943). 
 60 Id. at 468. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Zimring, supra note, 51. 
 64 Id. at 148. 
 65 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1966). 
 66 Id. at 651. 
 67 Kealy, supra note 26, at 282. 
 68 18 U.S.C. 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). 
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committed to mental institutions.”69  The 1960s ended with the federal 
government making it clear ‘who’ ‘law-abiding citizens’ were and how 
citizenship alone earned a citizen’s right to bear arms without government 
discouragement. 
The 1970s and 1980s kept with this mantra and emphasized that the 
right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’.  In 1972, an officer 
seized a gun from the waistband of a suspect.70  The officer “asked no 
questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched.”71  Critics at the 
time considered whether both the Second and Fourth Amendments were 
being watered down.72  There, the Williams Court held that if a police 
officer “has reason to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous, he 
may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to [his] protective 
purpose.”73  Williams allowed a police officer’s probable cause deduction 
that a suspect is not a ‘law-abiding’ citizen to temporarily restrict the 
suspect’s Second Amendment rights.74  Again, only if one is ‘law-abiding’ 
are Second Amendment protections safeguarded. 
Soon thereafter, the Court embraced the GCA in two consecutive 
cases.  First in 1976, the Barrett Court declared, “[the] very structure of 
the Gun Control Act demonstrates that Congress  . . .  sought broadly to 
keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially 
irresponsible and dangerous.  These persons are comprehensively barred 
by the Act from acquiring firearms by any means.”75  Then in 1980, the 
Lewis Court declared, “Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear 
his status [of felon] before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress’ 
purpose, broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress 
classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”76 
Although the Supreme Court stamped the GCA with its approval 
with these rulings, Congress implemented the Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act of 1986 (“FOPA”).77  FOPA was the congressional 
culminating statement that began in 1866, continued from 194178 to 1968, 
                                                                                                             
 69 Zimring, supra note 51, at 149 (citing Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 925(d)(3) 
(1970)). 
 70 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972). 
 71 Id. at 155. 
 72 Id. at 151. 
 73 Id. at 146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968)). 
 74 Barrett v. U.S., 423 U.S. 212, 96 S. Ct. 498, 46 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1976). 
 75 Id. at 218. 
 76 Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 64–65, 100 S. Ct. 915, 63 L. Ed. 2d 198 (1980). 
 77 Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, P.L. 99-308. 100 Stat. 449 (May 19, 1986). 
 78 Halbrook, supra note 56, at 636 (citing U. S. v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(Noonan, J., dissenting)). 
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and was best summarized in the 1985 Senate Judiciary Committee.79  
There, the history, concept, and wording of the Second Amendment 
indicated that it was “an individual right of a private citizen to own and 
carry firearms in a peaceful manner.”80  The 1980s ended with a familiar 
mantra, the right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’ or 
peaceful private citizen. 
The 1990s found the Supreme Court and Congress in less of a dance 
with one another and more of a friendly sparring match on the right to bear 
arms issue. The first scuffle began after Congress created the Gun Free 
School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) of 1990.81  GFSZA read in part, “It shall be 
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved 
in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that 
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school 
zone.”82  The Supreme Court responded to the GFSZA with United States 
v. Lopez in 1995.83  Lopez confronted Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority again when Congress attempted to qualify this criminal statute 
as an issue within “commerce.”84  This move was explained 
foundationally: “In the compound republic of America, the power 
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among 
distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to the 
rights of the people.”85 The right to bear arms was protected by the 
Founders’ insight into the separation of powers and ‘the people’ had not 
surrendered that right to Congress by way of the Commerce Clause.86 
The next scuffle of the 1990s occurred after Congress passed the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Law”) of 1993.87  The 
Brady Law had two components: background checks for gun purchasers 
that were to be provided by state law enforcement and a waiting-period 
gun dealers had to honor before consummating the sales.88  The waiting-
period issue never came before the court.89  Yet, in Printz v. United States, 
the Supreme Court addressed the background check issue with the same 
separation of powers concerns addressed in Tot and Lopez.90  The Printz 
                                                                                                             
 79 Kealy, supra note 26, at 283. 
 80 Id. 
 81 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2). 
 82 Id. 
 83 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 84 Id. at 561. 
 85 Id. at 576. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
 88 Id. at 903. 
 89 Id. at 935. 
 90 Id. 
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Court found that when the federal government conscripted state actors to 
enforce the Brady Act,91 it undermined the independent authority of the 
state and risked the degradation of the safeguards on individual liberty.92  
The Acts of the 1990s were the first hints that Congress was starting to 
weigh the negative externalities of bearing arms whereas the Supreme 
Court simply refused to participate in such a balancing act. 
It was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court forcefully documented 
its unwillingness to balance negative externalities of bearing arms with the 
enumerated constitutional right.93  In Heller, the District of Columbia 
banned handgun possession in the home. 94  The Supreme Court declared, 
the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment 
right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ 
that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. 
The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense 
of self, family, and property is most acute.95 
The Court concluded by declaring that prohibiting a law-abiding 
citizen from protecting his or her home and family by bearing arms failed 
constitutional muster.96 
Although the Supreme Court has challenged congressional 
movement on the Second Amendment, Congress has never challenged the 
Supreme Court on the issue. As of 2018, Congress has not challenged the 
Heller case.  To the contrary, Congress made a statement on bearing arms 
within the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act 
of 2009 (“CARD”).97  As odd as that seems, this Act has a provision 
protecting the right to bear loaded arms in national parks.98 Thus, 
Congress’s last words on the subject fully embrace the Second 
Amendment’s core that, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”99 
Not long after Heller, the Supreme Court followed up its ruling by 
hearing an Illinois case that claimed the Heller ruling did not apply to the 
States.100  As mentioned earlier, in the 1872 Slaughterhouse Cases, the 
Supreme Court placed State civil rights enforcement out of the hands of 
the federal government using the Privileges and Immunities Clause as its 
                                                                                                             
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 976–77. (Breyer, J., Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 93 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
 94 Id. at 628. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 628–29. 
 97 15 U.S.C. § 1601. 
 98 54 U.S.C. § 104906 (Protection of right of individuals to bear arms). 
 99 Id. 
 100 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 743. 
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tool.101  In 2010, the McDonald Court sidestepped the Slaughterhouse 
Cases and declared that “[C]ruikshank, Presser, and Miller do not 
preclude us from considering whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on 
the States.”102  McDonald further articulated that, 
[u]nder our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental . . . . then, 
unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the 
States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise 
solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.103 
With these words, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Second 
Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” 
that must not be conducted anew.104 
The most recent case105 heard by the Supreme Court on the topic of 
bearing arms was Caetano v. Massachusetts in March of 2016.106  There, 
a woman defended herself with a stun gun and was arrested, tried, and 
convicted of possession of that stun gun.107  What makes this case more 
interesting than most is that the lower court used the losing Heller 
arguments and then completely ignored the Heller ruling.108  After 
dismissing all the arguments, the Caetano court provided the pertinent 
issue itself, “[w]hether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes today.”109  This holding foreshadowed the 
Supreme Court’s future test for bearing arms going forward; whichever 
test is chosen, it will include the necessity of law-abiding citizens 
performing acts for lawful purposes.110  As the last words of the opinion 
attest, negative externalities balancing with enumerated constitutional 
rights is a fundamentally flawed method of protecting law-abiding 
citizens.111  “If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect [Ms.] 
Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state 
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authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than 
about keeping them safe.”112 
C. Yesterday and Today 
Part I of this article demonstrated the dance between the Supreme 
Court and Congress and in what manner those movements framed the who, 
what, where, and how of bearing arms.  The ‘why,’ the necessity of arming 
for the bearer, is obviously missing.  Even with longstanding prohibitions, 
which make certain activities outside the protection of the Second 
Amendment, Supreme Court decisions and congressional legislation 
focusing on the ‘why’ do not exist. 
Part II will explore the sister circuits’ heated argument about the 
‘why’ which has forced the issue of concealed carry to rise dramatically 
to the surface. The argument pits the circuits against each other and 
sometimes provokes panels to disagree within a circuit itself. Concealed 
carry is at the heart because citizens are being denied permits to carry 
weapons outside the home when open carry is not an option. However, 
open carry is not being adjudicated, only concealed. This is the reason the 
Supreme Court has denied hearing these cases. Until a case comes to the 
Court that takes on both manners of carrying weapons, certiorari will 
continue to be denied. 
In the meantime, certain circuit courts are holding on to Robertson 
from 1897 with both hands. As you may recall, the Robertson court 
discussed in dicta that Second Amendment protections were not available 
for concealed carry.113 However, Robertson is without precedent since its 
ruling is based on English law.114 To demonstrate this lack of precedence 
issue, the Supreme Court held that constitutional issues, 
[m]ust be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context 
of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English 
parliamentary system.  We should bear in mind that the English system differs 
from ours in that their Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate 
branch.115 
Therefore, not only has the history of Supreme Court decisions and 
Congressional acts not supported adding a ‘why’ to the regulation of 
bearing arms, the one supposedly precedential case that supports 
prohibiting concealed carry has no legal foundation within the United 
States.  Without even looking at the circuit courts, one would wonder how 
concealed carry for law-abiding citizens could be constructively banned. 
                                                                                                             
 112 Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1033. 
 113 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82. 
 114 Id. 
 115 U. S. v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972). 
222 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:209 
III. CIRCUIT COURT DETOUR INTO THE ‘WHY’ OF BEARING 
ARMS 
A. All Conflicting Circuits Agree, There is a Right to Bear Arms 
Outside the Home 
In the last decade, right to bear arms arguments in the circuit courts 
have lost focus on militia dependence and collective rights largely due to 
Heller and McDonald.116  These landmark Supreme Court cases created 
new arguments for the judicially dissimilar sister circuit courts to 
distinguish themselves and further dilute the arguments made.117  Today, 
the hot topic among the circuit courts is whether the law-abiding have a 
constitutionally protected right to bear arms in public.118  Even with this 
contentious topic, all circuit courts that have ruled on this issue agree, 
“[t]he Second Amendment right to bear arms extends outside the home or 
have assumed that the right exists.”119  This article will focus on circuit 
decisions from each side of the debate: the Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Ninth circuits versus the Fourth, Seventh and District of Columbia circuits. 
Initially, the Second Circuit declared, “[t]he Amendment must have 
some application in the very different context of the public possession of 
firearms.”120  The Third Circuit recognized “that the Second Amendment’s 
individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the 
home.”121 The Fourth Circuit assumed, “[t]he Heller right exists outside 
the home . . . .”122  The Seventh Circuit explained, “To confine the right to 
be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right 
of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.”123  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that, “pursuant to Heller and McDonald, an individual’s right 
to self-defense extends outside the home and includes a right to bear arms 
in public in some manner.”124  Finally, the D.C. Circuit concluded 
“(longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home, even in 
populated areas, even without special need, falls within the Amendment’s 
coverage, indeed within its core.”125 As shown, the sister circuits agree that 
                                                                                                             
 116 See Joseph B. Adams, Dispensing with the Second Amendment, 12 TRINITY L. REV. 
75, 113 (2004). 
 117 David O’Boyle, The Right to Bear Arms, 30 WASH. LAW. 25, 31 (October 2015). 
 118 Id. at 28. 
 119 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 947. 
 120 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88. 
 121 Drake, 724 F.3d at 431. 
 122 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
 123 Moore, 702 F.3d at 937. 
 124 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 948. 
 125 Wrenn v. D.C., 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
2018] Judicial Toleration for Bearing Arms in Public 223 
the right to bear arms in public cannot be prohibited but they disagree on 
what extent it can be regulated. 
B. Circuit Courts Sidestepping the Supreme Court 
The circuit splitting argument against concealed-carry permits 
begins with ‘why’ law-abiding citizens need to possess a firearm in public. 
The Second Circuit was the first to enter this side of the ‘bearing arms in 
public’ debate in 2012 when it embraced a longstanding principle first 
established in New York in 1913.126  In 1913, the “proper cause” 
requirement for obtaining a concealed weapons license for bearing arms 
in public was, 
 . . . it shall be lawful for any magistrate, upon proof before him that the 
person applying therefor is of good moral character, and that proper cause 
exists for the issuance thereof, to issue to such person a license to have and 
carry concealed a pistol or revolver without regard to employment or place of 
possessing such weapon.127 
The modern version of this law pinpoints ‘proper cause’ as, “a 
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general 
community or of persons engaged in the same profession.”128  This 
limiting standard allowed government authority to provide concealed 
weapon licenses only to those with a “special need for self-protection.”129  
The 1913 New York law was supported by the 1897 Supreme Court 
Robertson dicta, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not 
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”130 
In Kachalsky, the court acknowledged that Heller did not use a 
means-end scrutiny test when it held that “the ‘core’ protection of the 
Second Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home.”131  Yet, the Kachalsky court ruled 
that defense outside the home needs to meet an intermediate scrutiny test 
where “the fit between the challenged regulation need only be substantial, 
not perfect.”132  In order to withstand strict scrutiny, “[t]he law must 
advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means 
available.”133  To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a law “must be 
                                                                                                             
 126 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92. 
 127 1913 N.Y. Laws 608, at 1629. 
 128 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92.  (citing Klenosky v. N.Y City Police Dep’t, 75 A.D.2d 
793, 793, 428 N.Y.S.2d 
256 (1st Dep’t 1980). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82. 
 131 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-635). 
 132 Id. at 97. 
 133 Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984). 
224 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 14:209 
substantially related to an important governmental objective.”134  To 
withstand minimum scrutiny, “a statutory classification must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”135 
The Second Circuit choosing a standard of scrutiny was the first 
sidestep away from the specific Heller ruling.  For Heller declined to 
determine what level of scrutiny should be used for bearing arms outside 
the home.136  In fact, the Heller test consisted of a two-part approach 
purposely omitting a level of scrutiny distinction.137  The first part of the 
Heller test determined whether the individual right to bear arms for self-
defense was a protected Second Amendment activity.138  In the second 
part, the Court weighed the effect of the challenged gun laws on that 
activity to determine the extent of the burden.139  Nevertheless, Kachalsky 
circumvented the Heller analysis. 
Next, the Third Circuit entered this side of the ‘bearing arms in 
public’ debate in 2013.140  Like the Second Circuit, it chose not to use the 
Heller test, but instead, used its own 2010 two-part test.141  The Third 
Circuit asked 
whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee . . . If it 
does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law 
under some form of means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster 
under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.142 
The challenged law here came from a 1924 New Jersey law, which 
“directed that no persons (other than those specifically exempted such as 
police officers and the like) shall carry [concealed] handguns except 
pursuant to permits issuable only on a showing of ‘need.’”143  In 2013, the 
Drake court embraced this law as its “longstanding,” “presumptively 
lawful” exception to the Second Amendment guarantee.144  Thus, allowing 
it to move onto its second test, that of evaluating the law under some form 
of means-end scrutiny.145 
Drake began this inquiry by sidestepping the Supreme Court and 
declaring that strict scrutiny should only be used when the challenged law 
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burdens “the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home.”146  For self-
defense outside of the home, the Third Circuit went directly to an 
intermediate scrutiny test and asked, “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’ 
between this interest in safety and the means chosen by New Jersey to 
achieve it: the Handgun Permit Law and its ‘justifiable need’ standard.”147  
Unlike the intermediate standard embraced by the Supreme Court, where 
a law must be “substantially related” to an important governmental 
objective the Drake court skirted around the Supreme Court and embraced 
an arguably lower standard of “a reasonable fit” with legislative intent.148  
Thus, not only did the Third Circuit sidestep the Supreme Court by 
ignoring the Heller test, but it also adjusted the test for intermediate 
scrutiny.149 
Also in 2013, the Fourth Circuit repeated a two-part inquiry, similar 
to that relied upon by the Third Circuit, in order to evaluate the good-and-
substantial-reason requirement of the Maryland law being challenged.150  
There, the Woollard court held that “public safety interests often outweigh 
individual interests in self-defense.”151  Woollard, in full agreement with 
Drake and Kachalsky, held that the Second Amendment right of the party 
applying for a concealed-carry permit was burdened by the good-and-
substantial-reason requirement, but that burden was constitutionally 
permissible.152  This is but another consistent sidestep of the Supreme 
Court by the circuit courts. 
Finally in 2016, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the Heller two-part 
inquiry to fully embrace the Supreme Court’s 1897 holding in 
Robertson.153  The Peruta court established that Robertson and the history 
surrounding it were all that were necessary to declare that the Second 
Amendment does not protect the right of a member of the general public 
to carry concealed firearms in public.154  Peruta also brought to the surface 
the issue of open-carry.155  While addressing the dissent, Peruta 
acknowledged the dissent’s argument that combining California’s ban on 
open-carry and its “good cause” restrictions on concealed carry may 
violate the Second Amendment, “tantamount to complete bans on the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms outside the home for self-
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defense.”156  Nevertheless, since an open-carry argument was not before 
the Peruta court, the notion of a probable complete ban was not 
addressed.157 
Again, Heller is ignored by a circuit court and, as with all the 
petitioning cases above, the Court denied certiorari for Peruta.158  In his 
dissent of the denial, Justice Thomas stated that there is a “distressing 
trend” in the court that treats the Second Amendment as a “disfavored 
right” compared to the First and Fourth.159 This author suggests, as stated 
previously, the right case has not yet come before the Supreme Court that 
would allow it to take on open- and concealed-carry as a whole. 
When evaluating these circuit court decisions, the argument 
requiring law-abiding citizens to provide ‘why’ they need to possess a 
firearm in public to earn the right to bear concealed firearms, condenses 
down to following nineteenth-century Supreme Court dicta or passing a 
test that balances individual rights with public safety.  In contrast, sister 
circuits refuse to enter this “vast terra incognita” which the Supreme Court 
has chosen not to explore.160 
C. Circuit Courts Refusing to Enter Terra Incognita 
The Fourth Circuit reappears on the opposite side of the ‘bearing 
arms in public’ debate. Before the Fourth Circuit chose to require a reason 
‘why’ law-abiding citizens needed to carry a concealed weapon in 
Woollard, it ruled in Masciandaro that it would follow Heller and leave 
largely intact the right to “possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”161  The Masciandaro and Woollard courts did not share a 
single member of their judicial panels.162  Not surprisingly, while the 
Woollard court focused on the ‘why’, the Masciandaro court remained 
with the Supreme Court’s focus of ‘where’ law-abiding citizens are 
permitted to bear arms.163  Even in following the Supreme Court, the 
Masciandaro court struggled with the obscure nature of this “terra 
incognita.”164 Terra incognita has not been defined by the Supreme Court, 
but lower courts have described terra incognita as a place “where gossip 
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and guesswork abound”165 and as “blank areas which have no discernable 
details.”166  While Masciandaro wrestled with this lack of clarity, it held 
that “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be.”167 
The Seventh Circuit followed this course just months later with a similar 
but expanded argument.168 
In 2012, Moore began its analysis by boldly stating, “[a] right to bear 
arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”169  The 
Moore court reiterated that both Heller and McDonald were just about 
self-defense, and that a person is much more likely to need to be armed in 
a rough neighborhood rather than to have a loaded weapon under his or 
her mattress.170  The court evaluated multiple studies and their inconsistent 
conclusions led the court to find that “[i]f the mere possibility that 
allowing guns to be carried in public would increase the crime or death 
rates,” Heller would have been decided differently.171  To build on Heller’s 
longstanding prohibitions of  “gun ownership by children, felons, illegal 
aliens, lunatics, and in sensitive places,” the Moore court pointed to “a 
proper balance between the interest in self-defense and the dangers created 
by carrying guns in public is to limit the right to carry a gun to responsible 
persons.”172  Undoubtedly, the Moore decision is the inverse of the 
Kachalsky decision.173  In Moore, laws prevent dangerous people from 
having handguns whereas in Kachalsky laws prevent law-abiding citizens 
from having handguns without a justified need.174  Moore declares that if 
there is to be a balancing test, even if Heller says it is improper to make 
one,175 then the test should consist of measuring how public safety is 
balanced by responsible persons bearing arms in public.176 
In 2017, the District of Columbia Circuit Court became the last 
circuit court to touch on the ‘bearing arms in public’ debate and zealously 
followed Heller.177  The Wrenn court held that Heller revealed “the Second 
Amendment erects some absolute barriers that no gun law may breach.”178 
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The gun law in question was a D.C. Code provision, which limited 
“licenses for the concealed carry of handguns to those showing a good 
reason to fear injury to [their] person or property or any other proper 
reason for carrying a pistol.”179 Wrenn discussed sister circuit rulings 
where “the circuits settling on a level of scrutiny to apply to good-reason 
laws explicitly declined to use Heller’s historical method to determine 
how rigorously the Amendment applies beyond the home.”180 In line with 
that discussion, the Wrenn court did not settle on a level of scrutiny 
because D.C.’s ‘good reason’ law was “analogous to the ‘total ban’ that 
the Supreme Court struck down in Heller without pausing to weigh its 
benefits.”181 
The Wrenn court viewed the good-reason law as leaving “each D.C. 
resident some remote chance of one day carrying in self-defense.”182 The 
court emphasized the notion that D.C. residents’ Second Amendment 
rights were being infringed by stressing, “[t]he Second Amendment 
doesn’t secure a right to have some chance at self-defense.”183 This 
amounted to a ban on carrying weapons in public, forcing the court to 
conclude “that (longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home, 
even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the 
Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.”184 Thus, allowing the 
D.C. circuit to have the last word in the ongoing debate. 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPANDING TO THE ‘WHY’ 
A. Shifting the Burden to the Law-Abiding 
There are two necessary burdens of proof involved with the right to 
bear arms, that of the individual and that of the government.  The first is 
an individual’s burden to prove whether he or she falls in the category of 
one of the types of people who have been historically prohibited from 
bearing arms, such as youth, felons, and the mentally ill.185  Once an 
individual proves he or she is a responsible (mature in age with acceptable 
mental health), law-abiding (non-felonious) citizen,186 further questions 
must be answered about what firearm was to be borne, where the firearm 
was to be borne, and how the firearm was to be borne.187  The courts 
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created these questions over time, and these questions make up the 
“longstanding prohibitions” to bearing arms formed by the courts that take 
away Second Amendment protection.188 
The individual’s burden to be ‘law-abiding’ is interlinked with the 
“foundation of the administration of our criminal law” that one has the 
“presumption of innocence” without obvious proof that one is not law-
abiding. 189  The Supreme Court consistently holds the fundamental 
concept of the presumption of innocence and the equally fundamental 
principle that the government bears the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.190 This solid foundation supports the implication that 
once innocent, no further burden remains on the law-abiding citizen. Once 
an individual is removed from the list of people who have been historically 
prohibited from bearing arms, he or she is free to bear arms within the 
aforementioned limitations of what, where, and how.191 
Second, the government retains the burden to prove whether it has 
the authority to infringe upon an individual’s constitutional right to bear 
arms.192  At a very basic level, the Second Amendment declares that the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed by 
Congress.193  Also in its basic form, the Fourteenth Amendment declares 
that no state194 shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of 
law.195  Both of these amendments place strict limits on the government, 
not the individual.196 In Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, there 
exists an additional limitation.197  There, as emphasized by the Supreme 
Court in Katzenbach, “Congress’[s] power under §5 is limited to adopting 
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants Congress 
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”198  These 
amendments imply that the burden remains solely on the government to 
prove it has the authority to infringe upon a law-abiding citizen’s right to 
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bear arms.199  In general, this burden can be lessened by way of a means-
end scrutiny test.200 
A means-end scrutiny test does not apply when the challenged law 
fits within Second Amendment guarantees due to the Supreme Court 
“declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second 
Amendment restrictions.”201  For example, the circuit courts dutifully 
follow Heller’s ruling that challenged laws which impose a burden on 
conduct falling within the scope of Second Amendment guarantees are 
unconstitutional.202  A burden cannot fall on the individual for conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment; therefore, the burden lies squarely 
with the government.203 However, conduct deemed to be not protected by 
Second Amendment guarantees, as described in Part II, have left room for 
lower courts to introduce means-end scrutiny tests on challenged laws.204  
As of now, burdens are being shifted in the lower courts by using the 
intermediate scrutiny test where a law “must be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”205 
Whether it is Kachalsky’s “proper cause,”206 Drake’s “showing of 
need,”207 or Woollard’s “good and substantial reason” for why an 
individual should be permitted to exercise his or her rights,208 they all shift 
the burden.  For example, in Kachalsky, the plaintiffs were denied a full-
carry concealed-handgun license by one of the defendant licensing officers 
for failing to establish “proper cause”—a special need for self-
protection.209  There, instead of the government carrying the burden of 
proving that an individual constitutes a threat before taking away a 
fundamental right, the individual maintains the burden to prove that he or 
she is being threatened in order to exercise a fundamental right.210  The 
fundamental right here, mirrors Heller’s “inherent right of self-
defense.”211  This burden shift created by the lower courts gives greater 
weight to public safety than self-defense.212   Since the Supreme Court 
“elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
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citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,”213 this burden cannot 
be shifted in the home.  Shifting the burden from the government to the 
individual outside the home has not been ruled upon by the Supreme 
Court, but the Court made it known that the inherent right of self-defense 
does not end at one’s front door.214 
B. Interest Balancing not to be Redone Anew 
To settle this ‘bearing arms outside the home’ issue, an evaluation of 
interest balancing for bearing arms in public must be done. Remember, the 
Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the 
people” that the court should not “conduct for [the people] anew.”215  This 
phrase relates back to the consideration that “the people” of this country 
gave at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.216  Heller provided 
a clear illustration of lawful self-defense. 
[T]he laws . . .  punished the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine 
and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the local 
jail), not with significant criminal penalties.  They are akin to modern 
penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding or jaywalking. And 
although such public-safety laws may not contain exceptions for self-defense, 
it is inconceivable that the threat of a jaywalking ticket would deter someone 
from disregarding a “Do Not Walk” sign in order to flee an attacker, or that 
the government would enforce those laws under such circumstances. 
Likewise, we do not think that a law imposing a 5–shilling fine and forfeiture 
of the gun would have prevented a person in the founding era from using a 
gun to protect himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so the law 
would be enforced against him.217 
At the time of ratification, whether an individual needed to defend 
him or herself inside the home or out on the street, a law would not be 
enforced against him or her for lawful self-defense.218 
As a current example, the Supreme Court declared that it “would not 
apply an ‘interest-balancing’ approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-
Nazi march through Skokie.”219  The reference draws a picture of an 
extremely dangerous activity performed by law-abiding, responsible 
people in which the government would not interfere.220  In this example, 
First Amendment rights are being exercised.221   Using the Moore ruling 
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in the Seventh Circuit, the court considered a similar example that dealt 
with the Second Amendment.222 
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a Chicagoan is a good 
deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than 
in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being 
stalked or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is more 
vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her home than when 
inside. She has a stronger self-defense claim to be allowed to carry a gun in 
public than the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with 
doorman) has a claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress. But 
Illinois wants to deny the former claim, while compelled by McDonald to 
honor the latter. That creates an arbitrary difference. To confine the right to 
be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of 
self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.223 
With Judge Posner’s example above, it is apparent that he predicted 
the direction of the sister circuits.224  After Judge Posner authored the 
Moore opinion in 2012, the sister circuits followed by creating the very 
protective-order type restrictions that he presented in Moore.225  
Nevertheless, his point is clear, it would be an arbitrary decision to restrict 
one type of self-defense and not another.226  Therefore, an interest-
balancing approach that weighs public safety against self-defense of a 
responsible, law-abiding individual has already been done and should not 
be done “anew.”227 
V. JUDICIAL TOLERATION OF THE NEGATIVE 
EXTERNALITIES 
This article has established that public safety cannot undermine the 
inherent right of self-defense, which responsible and law-abiding 
individuals can exercise.  However, plenty of negative externalities affect 
the right to bear arms that beg the question of whether all law-abiding 
citizens should bear arms.  An incident involving police officers in New 
York who shot and killed a gunman on the street presents an instructive 
example of this question.228 During this confrontation, the police officers 
mistakenly shot nine bystanders.229  Although the officers were trained 
how to shoot, when to shoot, and when not to shoot, this horrible event 
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still occurred.230  Mistakes will be made by law-abiding citizens and that 
actuality does not diminish the fact that the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms does not depend on “casualty counts.”231 
Looking at the bigger picture, there are positive as well as negative 
externalities for bearing arms.232  The former focuses on “arms as a 
mechanism of self-defense that can ensure the safety of the gun-carrying 
individual”; the latter focuses on the “benefits to society as a whole.”233 
The positive externalities of public and private deterrence of wrong doing 
are arguably not outweighed by the negative ones.234  The negative 
externalities of bearing arms in public include individuals fearing “being 
mistaken for criminals and shot, or caught in a cross-fire between people 
asserting a right to bear arms for self-defense.”235  Even within such a 
harsh reality, the Supreme Court has choreographed its legal moves away 
from these named negative-externalities.236  The Court declared that when 
you “[d]isarm a community . . .  you rob them of the means of defending 
life. Take away their weapons of defense and you take away the 
inalienable right of defending liberty.”237  This is a constitutional view; a 
broader view that demands the judicial toleration of the negative 
externalities of bearing arms in public. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The journey between ratification and incorporation took over two-
hundred years, but the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms for 
responsible, law-abiding individuals is now fully enforceable against state 
and federal governments.  During those two-hundred-plus years, the 
Supreme Court and Congress consistently found that the right to bear arms 
was an individual right with few exceptions.  The questionable exceptions 
focused on in this article are found in Robertson’s dicta and the circuit 
courts. Robertson states that a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons 
does not infringe Second Amendment rights.  This dicta places concealed-
carry outside the guarantees of the Second Amendment.  As the Robertson 
case has shown to be without precedent and its dicta being a remnant from 
English law, the longstanding placement of concealed-carry as outside 
constitutional protections should be eliminated. 
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The Heller and McDonald courts lend plenty of support to this 
proposition.  Both courts find that constitutional protections are for law-
abiding citizens performing lawful acts.  The Heller court declared that the 
very enumeration of the right to bear arms removes from the branches of 
government the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right 
is really worth insisting upon for the law-abiding.238  For both Heller and 
McDonald, responsible, law-abiding citizens have an inherent right to self-
defense that is protected by the Second Amendment.239  Nevertheless, a 
handful of circuit courts are bringing forth the notion that the law-abiding 
must justify exactly ‘why’ they need to conceal carry.240  If looked upon 
with a First Amendment lens, these courts would be acknowledging that a 
citizen has freedom of speech but require that citizen to petition the 
government with a documented need to speak or it would be forbidden.  
As absurd as that sounds, circuit courts have made a similar argument for 
the Second Amendment since 2012. 
These courts lean on the negative externalities of bearing arms to 
further their position. However, neither Heller nor McDonald put much, if 
any weight to the inconsistent studies that have neither confirmed nor 
denied if the negative externalities outweigh the positive externalities.  
With this, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a means-end scrutiny 
test is not appropriate for self-defense issues.  The Court concluded that 
the right to bear arms by responsible citizens balances out the dangers 
created by carrying guns in public.241  In 2016, the Court followed up that 
conclusion with a warning, “[t]he lower court’s ill treatment of Heller 
cannot stand.”242 As of 2018, the Supreme Court has not acted on that 
warning or ruled specifically for reconstituting Second Amendment 
protections for the concealed bearing of arms in public. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s holdings throughout its history and its dicta in the past one-
hundred plus years lead this author to believe that open-carry and 
concealed-carry will be held together as constitutionally protected under 
Second Amendment guarantees for responsible, law-abiding citizens in 
the near future. 
Regardless of that prediction, today’s implications of requiring the 
law-abiding to have a special need for self-protection are many.  First, in 
requiring the intent of the law-abiding before they are permitted to exercise 
constitutional rights is a slippery slope that slides into having no rights at 
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all.  Second, the government being permitted to evaluate rights requests 
based on a balancing of that right with need for public safety, is exactly 
what it sounds like, a request to a government to exercise rights instead of 
a right in which a government is limited in its ability to infringe rights. 
Whether the burden of proof shifts from the government to the 
individual or a balancing test is being performed, Second Amendment 
rights continue to be infringed.  Therefore, the obvious next move for the 
Supreme Court is to return concealed-carry back under the protection of 
the Second Amendment.  This move will conclude the circuit courts’ 
venture into the terra incognita in which the law-abiding were forced to 
give a reason for ‘why’ they needed to defend themselves.  This future 
Supreme Court ruling would conclusively declare that no balancing test 
will be used when deciding whether law-abiding citizens can endeavor 
into lawful activity.  Then, judicial toleration of the negative externalities 
of bearing arms in public will bear constitutional fruit. 
